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THE HIDDEN HARMS OF TARGETED
ADVERTISING BY ALGORITHM
AND INTERVENTIONS FROM THE
CONSUMER PROTECTION TOOLKIT
— Jeannie Marie Paterson*, Shanton Chang†, Marc Cheong‡,
Chris Culnane**, Suelette Dreyfus††, and Dana McKay‡‡

Abstract: Developments in pervasive data collection and predictive
data analytics are allowing firms to target consumers with increasingly precise personalised, behavioural and contextual advertising.
These techniques give rise to new risks of harm in the attention
economy by unduly influencing or manipulating consumers’ decisions and choices, and by narrowing the product options visible
and available to them. In many countries, the legal response to
concerns about targeted advertising by algorithm has been focused
on privacy protection and data rights.
These are important initiatives. However, consent-based data rights
are unlikely to provide a comprehensive or even adequate response
to the risks of harm to consumers occasioned by the kinds of algorithmically targeted advertising that are now possible. This paper
suggests that a suite of responses from the consumer protection
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toolkit are required to address the different and potentially harmful manifestations of algorithmically targeted advertising. These
include bans and warnings as well as making use of standard safety-net prohibitions on misleading and unconscionable/unfair conduct already in place in many jurisdictions.
Keywords: Algorithm, Behavioural Advertising, Consumer
Protection, Data Privacy, Misleading Conduct, Profiling, Targeted
Advertising, Unconscionable Conduct, Unfairness, Undue Influence.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As many of us are now aware, we are living in an age of pervasive digital monitoring.1 Internet of Things devices,2 apps,3 loyalty cards, social media

1

2

3

See Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money
and Information (Harvard University Press 2016); Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler and Helen
Nissenbaum, ‘Technology, Autonomy and Manipulation’ (2019) 8 Internet Policy Review
1; Karen Yeung, ‘“Hypernudge”: Big Data as a Mode of Regulation by Design’ (2017) 20
Information, Communication and Society 118; Shoshana Zuboff, ‘Big Other: Surveillance
Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization’ (2015) 30 Journal of Information
Technology 75; Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (Profile Books 2019).
See eg, the Bluetooth enabled and cyber insecure children’s toy ‘Cayla’: Agata Dziedzic,
‘International: Connected Toys Cayla and i-Que Make It “Easy for Anyone to Eavesdrop” on
Children’ (OneTrust DataGuidance, 8 December 2016) <https://www.dataguidance.com/international-connected-toys-cayla-que-make-easy-anyone-eavesdrop-children/> accessed 17 May
2021.
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry (Final Report,
June 2019) 11 (ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry Report); Joe Tidy, ‘Tik Tok: What is the App,
and How Much Data Does it Collect’ (BBC News, 3 August 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/
news/technology-53476117> accessed 17 May 2021; Pat McGrath, Clare Blumer and Jeremy
Story Carter, ‘Medical Appointment Booking App HealthEngine Sharing Clients’ Personal
Information with Lawyers’ (ABC News, 26 June 2018) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-0625/healthengine-sharing-patients-information-with-lawyers/9894114> accessed 17 May 2021.
Also, Sarah Perez, ‘Following Apple’s Launch of Privacy Labels, Google to Add a “Safety”
Section in Google Play’ (TechCrunch, 7 May 2021) <https://techcrunch.com/2021/05/06/
following-apples-launch-of-privacy-labels-google-to-add-a-safety-section-in-google-play/>
accessed 17 May 2021.
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platforms,4 and search engines5 are engaged in extensive data mining: collecting and analysing vast amounts of data with every consumer interaction.
The data collected are linked to individuals or their devices to create a digital
profile of that person.6 Algorithms are used to find correlations between these
profiles and to make predictions about the future behaviour of similar individuals and groups. These predictions increasingly inform firms’ decisions about
who gets access to goods and services, and at what price;7 with applications
in determining access to credit,8 the cost of insurance,9 whether to interview
a prospective employee,10 and, the focus of this article, digital advertising.11 In
advertising, algorithmic processes allow firms to target consumers precisely
with advertising material that is designed to catch their attention on the basis
of their previous browsing habits, current location or predicted interests and

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

See eg, the Cambridge Analytica saga discussed at: Carole Cadwalladr and Emma GrahamHarrison, ‘Revealed: 50 Million Facebook Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica
in Major Data Breach’ (The Guardian, 18 March 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/
news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election> accessed 17 May 2021.
See also Nathan Heller, ‘Why the Life-Insurance Industry Wants to Creep on Your Instagram’
(The New Yorker, 26 February 2019) <https://www.newyorker.com/culture/cultural-comment/
why-the-life-insurance-industry-wants-to-creep-on-your-instagram> accessed 17 May 2021.
See eg, Zoac Doffman, ‘Why iPhone, iPad And Mac Users Should Avoid Google Photos’
(Forbes, 8 May 2021) <https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2021/05/08/why-you-shouldnever-use-google-photos-on-your-apple-iphone-ipad-imac-or-macbook/> accessed 17 May
2021.
See Salinger Privacy, ‘Cookies and Other Online Identifiers: Research Paper for the Office of
the Australian Information Commissioner’ (15 June 2020) 3. See GDPR art 4(1): ‘“profiling”
means any form of automated processing of personal data consisting of the use of personal
data to evaluate certain aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to analyse or predict
aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements’.
See generally Cathy O’Neil, Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases
Inequality and Threatens Democracy (Crown Publishing 2016).
See eg, Nikita Aggarwal, ‘Machine Learning, Big Data and the Regulation of Consumer
Credit Markets: The Case of Algorithmic Credit Scoring’ in Nikita Aggarwal and others (eds),
Autonomous Systems and the Law (Beck 2019). See also Sian Townson, ‘AI Can Make Bank
Loans More Fair’ (Harvard Business Review, 6 November 2020) <https://hbr.org/2020/11/
ai-can-make-bank-loans-more-fair#:~:text=AI%20and%20Equality&text=A%20landmark%20
2018%20study%20conducted,are%20members%20of%20protected%20classes.> accessed 12
July 2021.
Michele Loi and Markus Christen, ‘Insurance Discrimination and Fairness in Machine
Learning: An Ethical Analysis’ in Michele Loi and Markus Christen, ‘Choosing How to
Discriminate: Navigating Ethical Trade-Offs in Fair Algorithmic Design for the Insurance
Sector’ (2021) Philosophy and Technology. See also Liam Walsh, ‘Bot-backed Suncorp Aims
for 80pc Online Claims’ (Australian Financial Review, 11 May 2021) <https://www.afr.com/
companies/financial-services/bot-backed-suncorp-aims-for-80pc-online-claims-20210511p57qr2> accessed 12 July 2021.
Aislinn Kelly-Lyth, ‘Challenging Biased Hiring Algorithms’ (2021) Oxford Journal of Legal
Studies ( forthcoming).
See Julian Thomas, ‘Programming, Filtering, Adblocking: Advertising and Media
Automation’ (2018) 166 Media International Australia 34, 35.
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behaviours.12 Through these methods, firms aim to influence consumers’ purchasing decisions, as well as to differentiate offers and the pricing of products
between identified consumer cohorts or categories.13
The growth of algorithmically targeted advertising might initially appear a
trivial concern: advertising has long aimed to target the consumers who will
be receptive to its messages, and to steer consumers towards particular products and increased consumption. Some have argued that targeted advertising
benefits consumers by showing them more relevant ads. However, the use of
algorithmic processes to identify fine-grained distinctions between different
categories of consumers and to make predictions about their behaviour has produced a fundamental change in the character of advertising in the attention14 or
information15 economy. This change has a consequential impact on the risk of
harm to consumer autonomy and welfare. One concern is that consumers may
not be aware of the nature and scope of targeted advertising. Another concern
is that algorithmically targeted advertising may unduly influence or manipulate
consumer decision-making, as well as undermine their sense of well-being.16
Concerns also arise over the degree to which algorithmically targeted advertising determines the products that are made visible to individual consumers.17
What is filtered out as options for consumers may in this context be as significant as what is presented. This feature has the potential for reducing the scope
of choice in the market and also for discriminating against individuals and
groups. These harmful effects of targeted advertising by algorithm are, moreover, less easily avoided by consumers than might appear at first sight.
12

13
14

15

16

17

See eg, ‘Google Pay India Users to Start Getting Targeted Ads, Here is How You Can Opt
Out’ (The Financial Express, 12 March 2021) <https://www.financialexpress.com/industry/
technology/google-pay-india-users-to-start-getting-targeted-ads-here-is-how-you-can-optout/2211457/> accessed 12 July 2021; Stuart A Thompson, ‘These Ads Think They Know
You’ (The New York Times, 30 April 2019) <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/04/30/
opinion/privacy-targeted-adver tising.html?mtr ref=www.google.com&gwh=BC5DDB91D5483424EFDB04440D2D8F14&gwt=pay> accessed 12 July 2021; ‘Ad Targeting’
Facebook for Business <https://www.facebook.com/business/ads/ad-targeting> accessed 12
July 2021; Paul R. Milgrom and Steven Tadelis, ‘How Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning Can Impact Market Design’ (National Bureau of Economic Research, Working
Paper Series No 24282, February 2018) 21.
See Ryan Calo, ‘Digital Market Manipulation’ (2014) 82 George Washington Law Review 995.
Tim Wu, ‘Blind Spot: The Attention Economy and the Law’ (2019) 82 Antitrust Law Journal
771.
Julie Cohen, Between Truth and Power: The Legal Constructions of Informational Capitalism
(Oxford University Press 2019).
Göran Wågström, ‘Why Behavioural Advertising Should be Illegal’ (Forbes, 5 March
2019)
<https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2019/03/05/why-behavioral-advertising-should-be-illegal/?sh=40dd9c065b89> accessed 12 July 2021.
See generally DQUBE Solutions, Suelette Dreyfus, Shanton Chang and Andrew Clausen,
Drawing Back the Curtain: Consumer Choice Online in a Data Tracking World (Report, July
2020).
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These potentially adverse impacts of algorithmically targeted advertising
have become the subject of regulatory attention in a number of countries.18
Commonly, the regulatory response has been focused on strategies for protecting personal data, often through requiring consumers to be given notice of data
collection, retention and use,19 and buttressing the requirements for consumers
to consent to, and withdraw from, these practices.20 However, although notice
and consent procedures may be useful in alerting consumers to data practices,
and even act as some check on the unconstrained use of data by digital platforms and other firms, they should not be regarded as comprehensive measures
for protecting the rights and interests of consumers. Realistically, consumers
simply cannot read and respond to all of the information presented in data collection notices,21 and firms deploy choice architecture and ‘dark patterns’ that
push consumers towards privacy reducing options.22 Additionally, the impact of
individual decisions about data sharing on the collective interests of consumer
means that there is a good case for treating algorithmically targeted advertising systematically, rather than leaving the responsibility to affected individuals.
Thus, there is interest in some jurisdictions on placing substantive obligations
on data controllers to treat data subjects fairly.23 There has also been increased
recognition of the complementary role of consumer protection law in curbing
the worst excesses of data mining processes.24
18

19

20
21

22

23

24

See eg, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final
Report (2019) (ACCC Digital Platforms Report); Government of Canada, Strengthening
Privacy for the Digital Age (Discussion Paper 2019); House of Lords Select Committee on
Communications, Regulating in a Digital World (2nd Report of Session 2017-2019, March
2019); Competition and Markets Authority, United Kingdom, ‘Online Platforms and Digital
Advertising: Market Study Final Report’ (2020).
See eg, Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), Principles 1 and 5 (Australia); California Consumer Privacy
Act (California) §§ 1798.100, 1978.130; GDPR arts 12-14 (EU).
GDPR, art 6 (EU). See also Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 (India).
See eg, David Berriby, ‘Click to Agree with What? No One Reads Terms of Service Studies
Confirm’ (The Guardian, 4 March 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/
mar/03/terms-of-service-online-contracts-fine-print> accessed 12 July 2021; Øyvind H.
Kaldestad, ‘250,000 Words of App Terms and Conditions’ (Norwegian Consumer Council, 24
May 2016) <https://www.forbrukerradet.no/side/250000-words-of-app-terms-and-conditions>
accessed 12 July 2021.
See eg, Norwegian Consumer Council, Deceived by Design: How Tech Companies Use Dark
Patterns to Discourage Us from Exercising Our Rights to Privacy (June 2018); ACCC Digital
Platforms Report (n 18) 399-434.
See Mark J. Taylor and Jeannie Marie Paterson, Protecting Privacy in India: The Roles of
Consent and Fairness in Data Protection (2020) 16(1) IJLT 71 <https://4bac176f-2e16-421b823f-0ab6d7712f 85.filesusr.com/ugd/066049_688f6d511e7b4119a0dfd2a51c62d319.pdf >
accessed 12 July 2021; Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, ‘Privacy Act
Review Issues Paper Submission’ <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/the-privacy-act/review-ofthe-privacy-act/privacy-act-review-issues-paper-submission/executive-summary/> accessed 12
July 2021.
Stephen Corones and Juliet Davis, ‘Protecting Consumer Privacy and Data Security:
Regulatory Challenges and Potential Future Directions’ (2017) 45 Federal Law Review 65;
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This article considers the potential for harm to consumer autonomy and
welfare from targeted advertising by algorithm and the range of protective
strategies drawn from the consumer protection toolkit for responding to those
concerns. It argues that there is unlikely to be one comprehensive intervention
for protecting consumers from the risks associated with targeted advertising,
given the complex technical and policy aspects of its regulation. Rather, the
most effective outcomes are likely to be produced through a combination of
responses. These include the possibility of bans, disclosure and warnings, and
also in regulators making full use of the safety-net prohibitions on unconscionable and misleading conduct already found in most existing statutory
regimes. Indeed, these open textured principles offer a flexibly in adapting
to socio-technical change which may not be available under more rule-based
approaches.
The article begins by considering the digital profiling and predictive analytics which increasingly inform targeted advertising. It considers the harms
to consumers arising from these new manifestations of targeted advertising. It
then moves to legal responses – noting the options available under data protection law before moving to the complementary opportunities offered by
statutory consumer protection regimes. This suite of possible responses is considered with reference to legal regimes in place in India, Australia, the U.S.
and the EU. It finishes by noting the need for decision-makers, judges, regulators and consumer advocates, to develop a fulsome understanding of the
character, operation and uses of new advertising technologies and, indeed, of
algorithmic influences on decision-making generally, recognising that this
expertise may not yet exist and should be an ongoing aspiration. While we
acknowledge that any attempt to address the extensive market power exercised
by digital platforms may additionally require intervention from competition
law, in this article we focus on concerns of consumer welfare from a perspective of consumer protection law.
II. PROFILING IN CONSUMER MARKETS

Advances in digital technologies have allowed consumer behaviour to be
incessantly monitored.25 Data is collected using a range of methods including
store and loyalty cards, cookies, web and audio beacons, device or browser
fingerprinting and identifiers, and digital platform.26 Increasingly sophisticated

25
26

Damian Clifford and Jeannie Paterson, ‘Consumer Privacy and Consent: Reform in the Light
of Contract and Consumer Protection Law’ (2020) 94 Australian Law Journal 741.
Dana McKay, State of the Art in Data Tracking Technology (Report, November 2019) 5.
ACCC Digital Platforms Report (n 18) 387-9; Salinger Privacy, Cookies and Other Online
Identifiers: Research Paper for the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (15
June 2020) 8, ch 2.
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algorithmic processes allow the data collected from these discrete consumer
interactions to inform targeted advertising strategies. This is done by combining the data collected from discrete sources to create digital profiles of consumers which are linked to some form of individual or device identifier. These
identifiers can then be used to track consumers across their in-store and online
interactions to build the richness of the profiles. These consumer profiles can
be categorised into groups or segments based on correlations within the different data sets identified by algorithms, and then sold to advertisers. Consumer
profiles can further be analysed by statistical methods to find correlations
between profiles and preferences, and to make predictions about future behaviour.27 These findings can also inform advertising.
Importantly, consumer profiling goes deeper than straightforward identifying information such as consumers’ names, addresses and birthdates. It
includes information about who consumers socialise with, what websites and
online material they look at or click on, and their sources of news and other
media.28 Indeed, from an advertising perspective, the traditional identifying
details of a consumer may be less important than the information collected
about their behaviour. Data profiles are not based on an intimate or relational
knowledge of individual consumers. Put another way algorithms do not ‘see’
into consumers’ minds. Rather the digital consumer is an identity constructed
from data, what Yeung terms a ‘data derivative’, namely ‘abstractions of
an individual made up of fragments of correlated variables identiﬁed from a
match between some of her attributes with the proﬁles inferred from masses of
attributes from masses of individuals’.29
Digital consumer profiles are used as the basis for targeted advertising
strategies. The methods range in sophistication and in the degree to which
they may assist, annoy or harm consumers. Although descriptions of the different kinds of targeted advertising vary, it is useful to understand the main
approaches in order to better target regulatory responses, as well as identify any gaps in that response. One of the most common and well-recognised
manifestations of targeted advertising is retargeting, which involves sending
advertisements that follow consumers across their online browsing about products they may have clicked on earlier. Contextual advertising uses the context
in which consumer view material to send relevant advertising to them.30 For
27
28

29

30

See also ibid 40.
See also Mariam Nadeem and others, ‘Australia v Facebook: Regulating the Market for
Attention’ (Pursuit, 18 February 2021).
Karen Yeung, ‘Algorithmic Regulation: A Critical Interrogation’ (2018) 12 Regulation and
Governance 505, 515 citing Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security
Beyond Probability (Duke University Press 2013).
Privacy (n 26) 39.
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example, contextual advertising might show consumers marketing material for
raincoats when they browse a weather channel showing a forecast of rain.
Demographic advertising targets consumers on the basis of identified consumer segments built from individual profiles. For example, Facebook offers
firms the ability to advertise directly to customer lists, either held by the firm
or provided by a data firm, and to ‘look alike audiences’ based on the demographic features of their current customers.31 More subtle characteristics may
also be selected. The US Federal Trade Commission revealed some named lists
traded between data brokers and suppliers as including “Diabetes Interest”;
“Cholesterol Focus”; “Financially Challenged”; and “Urban Scramble”.32 The
ACCC pointed out in its Digital Platforms Report that Facebook advertising
categories in Australia included “opposition to immigration”; “far left politics”;
“vaccine controversies; and “climate change denial”.33
Demographic advertising targets consumers on the basis of categories built
from their exhibited behaviours and traits. By contrast, behavioural advertising
targets consumers on the basis of their predicted interests or behaviours, which
are derived from correlations between their digital profile and the behaviour of
consumers with similar profiles.34 An infamous example of behavioural advertising involved Target identifying historical patterns of purchasing behaviour
of pregnant women and then sending women who exhibited these behaviours
advertisements for baby products.35 Differential pricing is an application of this
process which allows firms to differentiate prices between customers according
to their predicted ability and willingness to pay.36
31
32

33
34

35

36

ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry Report (n 18) 387.
Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability Report
(2014) 117, quoted in Katharine Kemp, ‘Concealed Data Practices and Competition Law: Why
Privacy Matters’ (2020) 16 European Competition Journal 628, 649.
ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry Report (n 18) 446.
See eg, Alyssa Foote, ‘Online Ad Targeting Does Work: As Long as It’s Not Creepy’ (Wired,
5 November 2018) <https://www.wired.com/story/online-ad-targeting-does-work-as-longas-its-not-creepy/> accessed 12 July 2021; Klint Finley, ‘Facebook and IBM Team Up to
Supercharge Personalized Ads’ (Wired, 5 June 2015) <https://www.wired.com/2015/05/facebook-ibm-team-supercharge-personalized-ads/> accessed 12 July 2021.
Charles Duhigg, ‘How Companies Learn Your Secrets’ (The New York Times, 16 February
2012) <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html> accessed 12
July 2021. See also the harmful outcomes where the prediction is wrong: Siobhan Smith, ‘I
had a Miscarriage but the Targeted Pregnancy Adverts keep Coming’ (Metro, 21 April 2021)
<https://metro.co.uk/2021/04/21/i-had-a-miscarriage-but-the-targeted-pregnancy-adverts-keepcoming-14427222/> accessed 12 July 2021.
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius and Joost Poort, ‘Online Price Discrimination and EU
Data Privacy Law’ (2017) 40 Journal of Consumer Policy 347, 351; Maurice E. Stucke and
Ariel Ezrachi, ‘How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our Economy, Privacy, and Democracy’
(2017) 32 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1239, 1264. Also N. Levy, ‘Online Sales and
Differential Pricing’ (2018) Practical Ethics <http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2018/10/
online-sales-and-differential-pricing/> accessed 12 July 2021.
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Location tracking adds value to these other kinds of targeted advertising,
particularly when combined with Bluetooth beacons that allow precise and
indoor identification of location. Location data links information about actual
behaviour to digital profiles.37 It also allows advertising to be directed to consumers in specific locations with the possibly of linking the context created by
consumers’ location to predictions about what they might want in that location,38 for example, cafes in a fashionable inner-city area.
III. IS THERE ANY HARM IN ALGORITHMIC
TARGETED ADVERTISING?

On one view, algorithmically targeted advertising is just a continuation of
established practices. It might be argued that firms have always tried to influence consumer preferences. All marketing has the aim of influencing consumers’ purchasing decisions and it has long sought to optimise its outreach
to its intended audience. Bricks-and-mortar stores aim to influence consumer
choice through their advertising, by the very way in which they display their
products, and the ambience they create inside the store.39 By and large these
practices are not prohibited under existing law. Indeed, on one view, targeted
advertising may make life easier for consumers. In an age where consumers
are overloaded by information, the promise of targeted advertising is that it filters out irrelevant material and assists us to make choices that may otherwise
be overwhelming.40
However, the uses of algorithmic processes in advertising allow firms to go
well beyond what has been possible in the past. Although there is little empirical data on the effectiveness of targeted advertising, and it has been suggested
that the influence of such methods may be exaggerated,41 there remain ongoing
concerns about the risk of harm to consumers these approaches may generate.
37
38
39

40

41

Privacy (n 26) 39.
ACCC (n 26) 385-386.
cf Shmuel I. Becher, Yuval Feldman and Meirav Furth, ‘Seductive Oral Deals’ (2020) Law &
Psychology eJournal.
Gerhard Wagner and Horst Eidenmuller, ‘Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting
Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions’
(2019) 86 The University of Chicago Law Review 581 (‘Down by Algorithms?’). Also,
Melanie Heck and others, ‘Exploring Gaze-Based Prediction Strategies for Preference
Detection in Dynamic Interface Elements’ in Proceedings of the 2021 Conference on Human
Information Interaction and Retrieval (Association for Computing Machinery, New York, NY,
USA) 129-139 <https://doi.org/10.1145/3406522.3446013> accessed 12 July 2021.
Natasha Lomas, ‘The Case against Behavioral Advertising is Stacking Up’ (TechCrunch, 21
January 2019) <https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/20/dont-be-creepy/> accessed 12 July 2021;
Gilad Edelman, ‘Why Don’t we Just Ban Targeted Advertising’ (Wired, 22 March 2020)
<https://www.wired.com/story/why-dont-we-just-ban-targeted-advertising/> accessed 12 July
2021.

10

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL ON CONSUMER LAW AND PRACTICE

VOL. 9

These concerns arise from the very features that make targeted advertising by
algorithm attractive to firms, namely the opportunity to target advertising to
narrowly drawn consumer profiles, with different consumers seeing different
material and others not seeing some content or prices at all. These features
raise significant potential risks to consumer autonomy and welfare, including
through a lack of transparency, constraining consumer choice, the manipulation
of purchasing decisions and the exclusion of certain consumers and groups of
consumers.42
Working through these concerns, the most immediate objection to algorithmically targeted advertising lies in the lack of transparency and accountability.43 Consumer yield the data that fuels this form of advertising, yet many
consumers are unaware of the extent of the use made of that data in curating
what they see.44 In this sense, the fundamental data for access deal underlying
many consumer interactions with digital platforms involves an element of trickery or even deception. Consumers may be unaware that an advertisement they
see online is seen only by them, or people thought to be like them, and that
other consumers see different options.
Additionally, by removing alternative options from consumers’ sight, targeted advertising narrows their opportunities for choice.45 This means consumers are making decisions from a position of less than full information,
undermining the preconditions for the exercise of autonomy. This may well
lead to a reduced number of and variation in the overall options presented
to consumers. In other words, consumers may be constrained in their own
echo-chambers of advertising that constrain their world view on the basis of
their constructed digital profiles.46
Targeted advertising may, moreover, exercise considerable and possibly
undue influence on consumer preferences, including by triggering pre-existing sensitivities or making use of unconscious biases to the detriment of
consumers. Indeed, scholars describe the process as involving as involving

42

43

44
45

46

See In particular, Eliza Mik, ‘The Erosion of Autonomy in Online Consumer Transactions’
(2016) 8 Law, Innovation and Technology 1; Gerhard Wagner, ‘Down by Algorithms?
Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases and Shaping Preferences the Dark Side of Personalized
Transactions’ (2019) 86 University of Chicago Law Review 581.
Jeannie Paterson, Gabby Bush and Tim Miller, ‘Transparency to Contest Differential Pricing’
(2021) 93 Computers and Law 49.
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‘manipulation’,47 a ‘hypernudge’,48 ‘unfair persuasion’,49 and consumers as
being ‘drawn down by algorithms.’50 This concern is most immediately apparent in behavioural advertising which seeks to link advertising to consumers’ predicted interests or behaviours in order to promote products that may
attract attention without actually benefiting them. For example, rich foods or
expensive cosmetics might be advertised at times of day when consumers are
predicted to be feeling tired or stressed or people exhibiting low self-esteem
might be targeted with advertisements for diet products, or cosmetic surgery.51
Demographic advertising might work to similar effect, for example, by advertising alcohol to vulnerable teens.52 Even contextual advertising, which is less
dependent on consumer digital profiles, may work to similar effect where the
context of consumers’ online search is used to send advertisements for products that are palpably unlikely to promote their welfare. Examples might
include advertisements for expensive funeral insurance shown to consumers
seeking information about bereavement support groups, payday loans to consumers seeking information about gambling help53 or opioids to consumers
experiencing back pain.54
Algorithmically targeted advertising further has the potential to entrench
existing inequalities by allowing firms to discriminate between different consumer profiles. This creates particular risks for vulnerable and marginalised consumers who may disproportionally be restricted in their purchasing
choices and subject to unfavourable pricing. For example, there is potential for
47
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Calo (n 13); Damian Clifford, ‘Citizen-Consumers in a Personalised Galaxy: Emotion
Inﬂuenced Decision-Making, a True Path to the Dark Side?’ in Lilian Edwards, Burkhard
Schafer and Edina Harbinja (eds), Future Law: Emerging Technology, Regulation and Ethics
(Edinburgh University Press 2020).
Yeung (n 29).
Natali Helberger, ‘Profiling and Targeting Consumers in the Internet of Things: A New
Challenge for Consumer Law’ in Reiner Schulze and Dirk Staudenmayer (eds), Digital
Revolution: Challenges for Contract Law in Practice (Hart Publishing 2016) 135.
Wagner and Eidenmuller (n 42).
Rebecca Rosen, ‘Is This the Grossest Advertising Strategy of All Time’ (The Atlantic, 4
October 2013) <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/10/is-this-the-grossestadvertising-strategy-of-all-time/280242/> accessed 12 July 2021; ‘Emotional and Sentiment
Targeting’
(ADmantX)
<https://www.admantx.com/emotional-and-sentiment-targeting/>
accessed 12 July 2021.
‘Facebook Told Advertisers It Can Identify Teens Feeling “Insecure” and “Worthless”’ (The
Guardian, 1 May 2017); Sidney Fussell, ‘Facebook Allow Drug Ads to Target Teens, Activists
Say’ (Wired, 4 May 2021). See also DQUBE Solutions (n 17) 45-6.
See also ‘Video Games You Play Are Using Sneaky Tactics’ (ABC News, 3 May 2021)
<https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-05-03/video-games-you-play-are-using-sneaky-tactics-fourcorners/100098826> accessed 12 July 2021.
Alison Branley, ‘Google Search Data Used by Pharma Giant to Bombard Users with Ads
for Addictive Opioids’ (ABC News, 13 July 2019) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2019-07-13/
searches-data-mined-by-pharma-giant-to-promote-new-opioid/11300396> accessed 12 July
2021.
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discrimination through mechanisms such as Facebook’s advertising categories,
which allows targeting on the basis of features that may characterise disadvantaged groups.55 In addition, targeted advertising creates the potential to exclude
social groups from particular markets altogether.56 For example, in the U.S.
Facebook has been criticised for allowing advertisers to exclude certain groups
based on ‘racial affinity’.57
Reliance on inaccurate and incomplete data may further produce inequitable
outcomes that reinforce the existing marginalisation of individuals or groups.58
This is a particular concern where automated processes are premised on unrepresentative data, such as where particular social groups are missing because
historically, they have not participated in the spaces from which the data is
collected.59 Inaccurate and incomplete data risk recommendations that are not
welfare enhancing for people whose preferences and profiles are not included
in the data set on which recommendation are based. Where there is no data on
a group, there will be no products identified as suitable for them — they simply miss out or must make do with suboptimal results. There is also a risk that
data sets will become skewed as between those who actively do and do not
exercise rights over their personal data. If those who exercise control over data
are viewed as more savvy, then those who do not do this may be left at the
disadvantageous end of differential pricing.
In response to these various concerns, it might be commented that consumers can simply choose not to be influenced by targeted advertising: they
55
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Race’ (MIT Review, 5 April 2019) <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/04/05/1175/facebook-algorithm-discriminates-ai-bias/> accessed 12 July 2021.
Nicholas Davis, ‘The Future Relationship between Technology and Inequality’, How
Unequal? Insights on Inequality (Report, Committee for Economic Development of Australia,
April 2018) 110; Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence, AI in the UK: Ready, Willing
and Able? (House of Lords Paper No 100, Session 2017-2019) 108; The Future Computed:
Artificial Intelligence and Its Role in Society (Microsoft, 2018) 58-9.
Julia Angwin, Ariana Tobin and Madeleine Varner, ‘Facebook (Still) Letting Housing
Advertisers Exclude Users by Race’ (Pro Publica, 17 November 2017) <https://www.propublica.org/article/facebook-advertising-discrimination-housing-race-sex-national-origin> accessed
12 July 2021; Alex Hern, ‘Facebook Lets Advertisers Target Users Based on Sensitive
Interests’ (The Guardian, 16 May 2018) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/
may/16/facebook-lets-advertisers-target-users-based-on-sensitive-interests> accessed 12 July
2021.
Select Committee on Artificial Intelligence (n 56) 119.
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Review 18. See also, generally, Matt J. Kusner and Joshua R. Loftus, ‘The Long Road to
Fairer Algorithms’ (2020) 578 Nature 34.
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can tighten privacy settings, disable settings allowing personalised advertising, look in several sources for products and compare bricks and mortar stores. However, this response is practically unrealistic. Given the current
lack of transparency, and likely lack of understanding about algorithmic targeted advertising, it is not straightforward for consumers to step out of the
‘bubble’ of personalisation created around them to access other opportunities,
particularly in circumstances where going ‘out to shop’ is not safe or viable.
Navigating online privacy controls is commonly time-consuming and sometimes tricky. The hurdles for consumers taking control of their data privacy are
amplified by the common use of choice architecture in the display of privacy
notices and contract terms. These may use ‘dark patterns’ which confuse consumers and steer them towards data sharing options.60 Privacy enhancing and
data preserving self-help technologies are available but may require a certain
level of technical knowledge and expertise to identify and install.61 Even the
results of search engine inquiries or comparison websites may be tainted, with
the ranking of results in some cases determined by payments or commissions62
or personalisation based on consumers’ digital profiles.63
IV. CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS

Regulators and legislators have responded in different ways to concerns about algorithmically targeted advertising.64 One of the most common
responses is through reform to data privacy law, primarily through provisions
insisting on through robust mechanisms for obtaining consent to data collection and use. The most prominent example of such as this kind of regime is the
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).65 Consent is a central tenet of
the GDPR.66 Under Art 6(1), personal data may not be processed unless under
60
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Information’ (The Media Center at the American Press Institute, 2003) Jamie Luguri and Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, ‘Shining a Light on Dark Patterns’ (2021) 13 Journal of Legal Analysis 43.
See eg, The Royal Society, ‘Protecting Privacy in Practice: The Current Use, Development
and Limits of Privacy Enhancing Technologies in Data Analysis’ (March 2019) 10.
See Google Ads, ‘What is Paid Search?’ <https://ads.google.com/intl/en_au/home/resources/
what-is-paid-search/> accessed 12 July 2021.
See ACCC Digital Platforms Inquiry (n 18) 23.
Helberger (n 49).
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1 (‘GDPR’) art 25.
See generally Lee A. Bygrave, ‘Data Protection by Design and by Default: Deciphering the
EU’s Legislative Requirements’ (2017) 4 Oslo Law Review 105.
See Inge Graef, Damian Clifford and Peggy Valcke, ‘Fairness and Enforcement: Bridging
Competition, Data Protection and Consumer Law (2018) 8 International Data Privacy Law
200.
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a lawful basis specified by the regulation or the data subject has given consented to the use. Art 4 defines operative consent as:
any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of
the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by
affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal
data relating to him or her.
These processes mean that under the GDPR, consent must be given to each
of the purposes for which data may be processed, the consumer must have the
option not to consent to these purposes and may revoke consent at any time.67
Information about the processes for which consent is being given must be ‘in
a concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and
plain language’.68
Law reform initiatives in India have proposed similar levels of safeguard
for consent to data collection and processing.69 In India, the Personal Data
Protection Bill 2019 (India)70 seeks to provide for protection of personal data
of individuals.71 Under section 11, personal data ‘shall not be processed, except
on the consent given by the data principal at the commencement of its processing’ or one of the other legal bases for processing is met. Section 11(2) of
the Bill sets out criteria for valid consent, including requiring consent to be
free, informed, specific and clear. In addition, the Bill proposes a considerable governance role for ‘data fiduciary’ who is ‘any person … who alone or
in conjunction with others determines the purpose and means of processing of
personal data.72 The data fiduciary under the Bill is under a responsibility to
process personal data ‘in a fair and reasonable manner and ensure the privacy
of the data principal’.73 Algorithmically targeted advertising raises the tension
between a statutory appropriation of the concept of a fiduciary who is supposed to act in the best interests of beneficiaries, and a context where the very
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See also Taylor and Paterson (n 23).
Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 (India), s 3. There is a further category of ‘significant
data fiduciary’. The Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 (India), s 26 establishes the conditions
under which a data fiduciary may be defined as a significant data fiduciary, and thus subject to
additional responsibilities.
Personal Data Protection Bill 2019 (India), s 5(a).
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purpose of that collection is to inform commercial advertising.74 Nonetheless,
the proposal represents recognition that consent-based mechanism are not on
their own sufficient to protect consumers’ interests. A more substantive regulatory standard is required.75 Consistently, in Australia, a review of the Privacy
Act 1988 has also raised the possibility of measures for introducing more
robust requirements for consent to the collection and use of personal data, as
well as a general fairness obligation on data controllers.76
Processes for obtaining consent that meet the standards of ‘freely given,
specific, informed and unambiguous’ or ‘voluntary, express and informed’ will
not necessarily ensure that consumers read and accurately assess the guidance they are given on the purposes of the data processing for which consent
is sought. The requirements do demand a more rigorous verification of something closer to informed consumer consent than currently exists in private law.
This may stem the flow of data that feeds algorithmic advertising. However, it
is increasingly recognised by scholars and lawmakers that these reforms will
not provide a complete or even adequate response to concerns over algorithmic
advertising.77
Seeking consent, usually preceded by mandatory disclosure of the information deemed relevant to decision-making, is of course the classic neoliberal
response to consumer protection. It seeks to correct the imperfections of the
market by empowering consumers to themselves manifest better choices.78 As
in other fields, it is clear that requirements to seek consent to data use, even
though more robust and rigorous processes are not the entire solution to the
problem of significant information asymmetry in the consumer market. The
challenges of relying on individual consent-based processes for data collection
and processing are particularly germane in contexts where consumers have low
or uneven literacy rates, or poor awareness of their consumer rights.79
Consumers cannot meaningfully be asked to give up their data without some understanding of what may be done with that data, the inferences
74
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Measures in Global Market Milieu’ (2020) 10 Journal of Research in IT and Management 19,
31.
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that may be drawn about them, the ways in which their data may be combined with other sources and the consequences for their market interactions.
Yet it seems likely that consumers are currently largely unaware of these processes,80 and indeed misunderstand the purpose of privacy policies.81 Some
form of consumer education strategy might assist in narrowing this information gap. However, ultimately, problems of information overload and inaccessibility, along with the pressures of time, limit the use that most consumers
can make of privacy policies in providing informed consent to data collection
and processing practices they deal with on a daily basis.82 There can be little
real expectation that consumers will make use of privacy policies83 in circumstances where they struggle to read the disclosure statements associated with
financial products,84 are confused by contract boilerplate85 and cannot hope to
read the terms of online retailers to know their rights to return.86 There is also
the risk of developing fatigue on the part of consumers following from constant request for consent,87 which undermines the faith put on privacy notices
and policies in protecting consumer data privacy.
Moreover, the very digital form of privacy policies enables firms to deploy
significant hurdles to consumers trying to exercise control over data privacy.
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Privacy policies are complex and opaque.88 Studies have found that representations about how to opt out of data collection practices by digital platforms and
other entities collecting information about consumers are often unhelpfully
oblique, and the options difficult to access.89 Choice architecture further steers
consumers away from making choices that would restrict data flows and are
counter to the interests of firms using that data.90
V. BANS AND WARNINGS

There are other available strategies that might be utilised to complement
data privacy reforms and thereby provide more comprehensive protection
to consumers than through consent mechanisms and their consequent individualism of responsibility. Which of these might be adopted will depend on
policy choices and regulatory decisions about how compelling the case for consumer protection is considered to be within the social and cultural context in
question.
The most robust response would be to ban algorithmically targeted advertising altogether.91 There have been suggestions from some regulators, scholars
and consumers advocates for comprehensive bans on targeted advertising using
pervasive tracking or profiling techniques, because of its significant potential
to harm consumers with particular sensitivities and situational vulnerabilities.92 There have also been proposals to ban specific applications of targeted
advertising, such as advertising involving the profiling of children.93 This may
appear a considerable intervention in the operation of the market, but equally
88
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(2020) 16 European Competition Journal 628; Lauren E. Willis, ‘Deception by Design’ (2020)
34 Harvard Journal of Law and Technology 115.
See also Data Protection Working Party, Guidelines on Automated Individual DecisionMaking and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, 17/EN, WP251 (3 October
2017); Margot E. Kaminski, ‘The Right to Explanation, Explained’ (2018) 34 Berkeley
Technology Law Journal 189: discussing whether personalised advertising may be prohibited
under art 22 of the GDPR.
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2021)
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what is contemplated is not a ban on all advertising. There have, moreover,
been doubts raised about the effectiveness of targeted advertising,94 especially
given an overall lack of transparency in the online platform market.95 So the
loss to the industry from a ban on some forms of targeted advertising may not
be too great.
We might also expect discriminatory or unfounded differential pricing to
come under scrutiny, also with possible bans. An exemplar may be the Indian
Consumer Protection E-Commerce Rules 2020, s 4(11)(b) which preclude
an e-commerce entity from manipulating price offerings or discriminating
between consumers on the basis of arbitrary classifications.96
An alternative, or indeed complement, to bans is to assist consumers in better understanding the breadth of deployment of algorithmic advertising, and the
associated phenomenon of differential pricing.97 Here it might be possible to
demand that consumers be provided with warnings when these strategies are
deployed. The goal would not be to provide full disclosure of all relevant terms
and conditions but to draw consumers’ attention to unfamiliar or possibly
harmful advertising practices, for example ‘this price is personalised to you
and other consumers may be offered different prices’.
The efficacy of regulatory reliance on mandatory disclosure as a central
strategy of consumer protection has been challenged in a number of ways.98 As
we have seen with privacy policies, often the information provided is simply
too complex and confusing for consumers to make sense of it. One response is
to emphasise the role of focused warnings as opposed to lengthy disclosures.99
We know that concise, targeted information is generally a more effective way
of communicating with individuals than generalised high-volume information.100 A simple stark warning about personalisation or micro-targeting in
advertising offerings may be sufficient to prompt consumers to look further
94
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afield before making a purchasing decision. It might even lead them reflect on
their data privacy choices, and the value of enhancing privacy by refusing to
share data for advertising purposes.101 This kind of approach has, for example,
been utilised in recent reforms in consumer credit law in Australia by requiring warnings about financial risk and alternative sources of credit to be displayed alongside offers of high cost ‘payday’ loans.102 The EU already requires
traders to inform consumers about differential pricing.103 Under the proposed
EU Digital Services Act, greater transparency measures would apply to online
advertising including a requirement for platforms to display ‘meaningful information about the main parameters used to determine the recipient to whom the
advertisement is displayed’.104
Digital technology may be used to improve the disclosure of information
relevant to the consumer consent process, and also the saliency of particular
kinds of information such as warnings.105 Technology might also be utilised to
allow consumers to understand and exercise their rights under law more easily.
For example, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 requires businesses
to incorporate a ‘Do Not Sell My Personal Information’ link on their website
homepage,106 which takes consumers to a designated webpage which enables
them to ‘opt-out’.107 It is further possible to envisage technology being used to
assist consumers in decision-making, not by deciding for them, but by guiding them through the decision-making process to an optimal outcome. What
is sometimes termed ‘layered’ or ‘smart’ disclosure allows for the possibility
of ‘data to be generated and analysed by, or tailored to the specific needs of,
the reader who is accessing it’.108 This process allows consumers to access
101
102
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104
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the information that is relevant to their own needs,109 and to use self-assessment tools to direct them to the information most likely to be pertinent to their
circumstances.110
These ideas are attractive as placing control back with consumers. However,
they are not absolute solutions. Warnings may not entirely overcome the issues
around information overload, referred to earlier, which inclines consumers
against reading information relevant but not central to their purchasing decisions.111 There may also be distributive concerns about relying on private sector
responses to consumer protection. Not all consumers will have access to the
kinds of device or data that would make these kinds of digital solutions possible. It is also possible to envisage online traders being able to discriminate in
their tech enabled ‘transparency’ responses between classes of high and low
value consumers.112 Therefore more substantive protections should be seen as
complementing measures such as warnings, by setting the boundaries as to
what is acceptable in dealings with consumers.
VI. PROHIBITIONS ON MISLEADING AND
UNCONSCIONABLE/UNFAIR CONDUCT

Outside law reform with a specific focus on algorithmically targeted advertising, we think that considerable work in complementing data privacy regimes
may be done by the key ‘safety-net’ or general prohibitions that exist in most
statutory consumer protection regimes, primarily on false or misleading conduct, and unconscionable or unfair conduct.113 Drawing the line between more
and less acceptable forms of targeted advertising, according to the degree to
which information is distorted and the extent of manipulation of consumers’
situational vulnerabilities is precisely the task that the open textured nature of
these kinds of prohibitions makes them capable of performing.114 We suggest
moreover, that a generous approach should be taken to the operation of these
prohibitions in applying to algorithmically targeted advertising because, given
their relatively recent development, consumers are themselves likely to be
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unaware of the scope of the reach and influence of these processes, and hence
more vulnerable to their operation.
Egregious instances of manipulative or predatory targeted advertising might
be met through prohibitions on unconscionable conduct115 which apply to conduct that takes advantage of consumers’ lack of bargaining power or a position
of disadvantage, in a manner that is contrary to established community values.116 For example, it may be unconscionable, and unfair, to target advertising
to consumers who have been identified through their online conduct or digital
profiles as experiencing a personal crisis or subject to some form of situational
vulnerability, in order to promote expensive products superficially responding to those circumstances, but in reality offering little utility to them.117
Prohibitions on unfair trading practices118 might further extend to more subtle forms of manipulation through advertising that targets behavioural biases or
emotional traits in order to produce sales.119 Discriminatory strategies should
also fall foul of these prohibitions, as well as being caught by anti-discrimination law.
More generally, we suggest that statutory prohibitions on misleading conduct120 have as yet unrealised potential in responding to instances of targeted
115

116

117

118

119

120

See Jeannie Marie Paterson, ‘Regulating Consumer Contracts in ASEAN’ in Luke Nottage
and others (eds), ASEAN Consumer Law Harmonisation and Cooperation: Achievements and
Challenges (Cambridge University Press 2019).
See eg, Jams 2 Pty Ltd v Stubbings [2020] VSCA 200, [90] (Beach, Kyrou, Hargrave JJA).
Also compare Shiv Swaminathan, ‘Coercion, Undue Influence and Unconscionability’ in
Mindy Chen-Wishart, Stefan Vogenauer and Hiroo Sono (eds), Studies in the Contract Laws
of Asia IV: Validity (Oxford University Press: forthcoming).
See eg, Matt Day, ‘Amazon is Working on a Device That Can Read Human Emotions’
(Bloomberg, 23 May 2019) <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-23/amazonis-working-on-a-wearable-device-that-reads-human-emotions> accessed 12 July 2021; Emily
Bell, ‘How Ethical is it for Advertisers to Target Your Mood?’ (The Guardian, 5 May 2019)
<https://www.theguardian.com/media/commentisfree/2019/may/05/how-ethical-is-it-for-advertisers-to-target-your-mood> accessed 12 July 2021; Andrea Peterson, ‘Watch Out, Ladies:
Your Period-Tracking App Could Be Leaking Personal Data’ (The Washington Post, 4 August
2016)
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/08/03/how-your-periodtracking-app-could-leak-your-most-intimate-information/?utm_term=.2cfe585dd363> accessed
12 July 2021.
Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices (Directive 2005/29/EC), art 5(1) (unfair commercial
practices); Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (prohibiting ‘[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce’); Consumer Protection Act 2019 (India), ss 2(6), 20, 47, 58 (practices that
are unfair and prejudicial to consumers’ interests); Australian Consumer Law (n 113) s 21.
See Willis (n 89) 176: arguing that courts should treat conduct that exploits consumers’
pre-existing false beliefs as unfair’. See also Hirsch (n 75).
Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices (Directive 2005/29/EC), art 6; Federal Trade
Commission Act § 5(a), 15 USC § 45(a); Australian Consumer Law (n 113) s 18; Consumer
Protection Act 2019 (India), ss 2(28), 21: outlining the power of the Central Authority to issue
directions and penalties against false or misleading advertisements. See also discussion in
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advertising that, although not reaching the threshold for an unfair practice,
undermine consumer welfare by leveraging general consumer ignorance about
online advertising practices. Promoting a ‘best price guarantee’ for a product
may be misleading if different consumers are, for no good reason, presented
with differential pricing.121 The potential of the prohibition might further be
pushed past blatantly untruthful strategies to respond to algorithmic advertising that lacks a baseline level of transparency. Prohibitions on misleading conduct may cover omissions as well as positive statements.122 This is relevant in
a context where consumers do not understand algorithmic advertising and have
few mechanisms for identifying its application. In this context, it might therefore be possible to argue that targeted advertising or differential pricing is misleading if presented without clarification of its personalised character or that
some options may not be visible to consumers through not being highlighted in
search results or because that consumer is excluded from the target categories.
Of course, the differential and detrimental effects on individual consumers
of targeted advertising may be difficult to prove in practice precisely because
of the personalised and therefore variable nature of the advertising.123 Another
strategy, therefore, that may have wider effects in constraining digital targeted
advertising is robust regulatory enforcement of privacy policies and notices.
While consumers have limited capacity to police privacy policies, robust regulatory scrutiny of the veracity and transparency of such policies may go some
way to constraining untrammelled and unauthorised data uses.124
Prohibitions on misleading conduct have already been used by regulators
to sanction digital platforms that misled consumers over the scope of their
data rights, such as by making assertions in contracts or privacy policies that
are not true, subsequently departed from or confusing to consumers.125 The
Federal Trade Commission in the U.S. has fined Facebook for misrepresenting
to consumers the extent to which they could exercise control over the collection and use of personal data.126 The Australian Competition and Consumer

121
122

123

124

125
126

Vipan Kumar and Adya Sharma, ‘Strengthening Consumer Rights: The Advent of Consumer
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Liability for misleading omissions is expressly acknowledged in the EU: Directive on Unfair
Commercial Practices (Directive 2005/29/EC), art 7.
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Compare E. Fosch-Villaronga, and M. Heldeweg, ‘“Regulation, I Presume?” said the Robot–
Towards an Iterative Regulatory Process for Robot Governance’ (2018) 34(6) Computer Law
& Security Review 1258.
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Commission has commenced enforcement action against Google for misleading conduct in departing from the expectations created by its own privacy
notices.127 It has, moreover, been successful in a claim against Google for misleading conduct by reason of the very design of the information presented to
consumers about the steps that might be taken to protect their data privacy
through disabling location tracking.128 In jurisdictions with statutory control
over unfair contract terms,129 those regimes might be used by regulators to
curb some of the excesses of privacy and data collection statements, although
as yet this remains an undeveloped jurisdiction.130
These possible responses require relevant stakeholders – consumer advocates, regulators, and particularly judges and decision makers – genuinely to
understand the scope and consequences of new technologies from a consumer
perspective. It is possible, as Tim Wu observes, that courts may be unwilling to acknowledge the harm that can be done through conduct that manages
consumers’ ‘attention’, as opposed to directly inflicting physical or financial harm.131 If algorithmic targeted advertising techniques are seen as a mere
continuation of previous advertising practices, then courts in particular may
be less sympathetic to the subtle influences these exert on consumer decision-making being worthy of a legal sanction.132 This requires regulators to
be scrupulously rigorous in creating their case theory and garnering evidence
to establish that case. Thus, for example, in the recent Australian litigation
against Google, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission presented comprehensive evidence including screenshots, flow charts and different use scenarios of the choice architecture presented to consumers of android
phones concerned to limit location tracking.133
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There is, moreover, a potential synergy that could be created between regulators in different countries in terms of enforcement and litigation strategies.134
Technology evolves so quickly that law reform is always likely to lag behind
market practices. Thus, it will be increasingly beholden on those interested in
consumer protection to stay informed about these developments and to be prepared to push the application of traditional forms of legal protection to respond
to new harms.
VII. CONCLUSION

It is important in considering the regulation of any emerging technology to balance concerns about the use of the technology against the benefits
it undoubtedly offers to consumers. However, we should not be so bedazzled
by the newness of the technology that we fail to scrutinise its effect on core
social values of consumer autonomy and welfare. Targeted advertising is the
output of endemic consumer surveillance and holds the potential to constrain
and reprioritise consumer choice, especially for marginalised groups. Better
outcomes for consumers subject to algorithmically targeted advertising requires
a change in the current and foreseeable future practices of digital platforms
and the AdTech industry. Individual consumers cannot force this change, and
indeed nor can individual regulators. What is needed therefore is a coordinated
approach between the regulators responsible for privacy, competition and consumer protection, and between regulators in different jurisdictions.
As a way of contributing to this discussion, this article has canvassed a
suite of possible regulatory tools for responding to these risks of harm from
targeted digital advertising enabled by algorithmic processes. It has noted the
regulatory focus on data rights protections, principally through consent processes, as well as the possible role for bans and disclosure mechanisms. It has
also advocated for making better use of traditional consumer protection tools,
namely on prohibition misleading, unconscionable and unfair conduct. The
point is to recognise the need for a suite of regulatory responses to the impact
of emerging technologies so as to both inform and protect consumer choice.
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